The 'Structured Communication' of Events by Hall , Stuart
c .c .c .s SP5
THE 'STRUCTURED COMMUNICATION' OF EVENTS
by
STUART HALL
THE ’STRUCTURED COMMUNICATION’ OF EVENTS
—Paper~£ori
UNESCO: Division of Philosophy
Stuart Hall
Centre for Cultural Studies 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston
In this paper, I am dealing exclusively with the 'public' forms of 
social communication, more especially with the broadcasting systems (radio 
and television).
In what sense can we speak of 'obstacles to communication' in the
broadcasting media? Let vis turn the question around: can we conceive of
a publicly-organized mass media system in which there were no obstacles to
communication? I suggest that, the moment we put the question in this form,
we have to admit that the ideal of 'perfectly transparent communication* in
broadcasting is, for the forseeable future, an unattainable and impossible
ambition. There are many reasons for this. Some have to do with the technical
(1)nature of the 'media* themselves which mediate public communication. Some
have to do with the character of the internal and external or 'framing'
(2)institutions within which public communication is organized. Some, indeed, 
stem from the fact that we are not dealing with static communications systems, 
with fixed goals, which can be progressively realized along some linear 
continuum. Broadcasting systems sire dynamic structures which breed their own, 
further, needs and uses even as they satisfy existing ones. So, even if 
broadcasters could now, technically, reach all the existing audiences they 
can identify, and transmit perfectly to them whatever information they desire, 
the very overcoming of present obstacles which such a development would signal 
would, in its turn, suggest new, further kinds of communication, new potential 
uses for the technical means, new types of content, and mobilize new, unrealized 
demands and needs for communication in the audiences. In the British situation 
it has certainly been the case that, as television has come into unchallenged 
dominance as the medium of public communications, and as many of the technical 
limitations of the medium have been ironed out, so new demands have been made 
on the broadcasting institutions, both from within their own professional ranks, 
and from the publics they serve, and from their political masters who put them 
to use within a context of legislation and practice. Each new, significant, 
development in British television - the growth of television documentary, the
development of problem-centred current affairs journalism, the explorations 
in television satire, etc - has mobilized new, unexpected audiences, which have, 
in their turn, framed new demands on the broadcasters# In broadcasting, as in 
other areas of modern production, the satisfaction of existing communications 
'needs' inevitably leads to the framing of new needs, and "this production of 
new needs is the first historical act" (as Marx once observed) which initiates 
an unending dialectic, whose outcome cannot be predicted.
Let us begin, then, from the opposite end. All public communication
systems are subject to systematic constraints, systematic limitations. The
overt censorship of media content is only one, limited case of such constraint -
and, in our view, not characteristically the most significant obstacle to
'freer communication'; though no system that we know of in the 'Western'
liberal class-democracies is entirely free of censorship. All public-social
communication is a form of 'systematically distorted communication'. The
distortions are not always the same: they are not fixed. So it. is worth our
while - as we attempt to do below - to examine some aspects of the structural
constraints within which public communication operates, in order to see what
changes can be effected which might eliminate or weaken some of the present
obstacles. ..Communication systems in different societies certainly exhibit
greater or lesser degrees of 'distortion', and can be shown to be moving
towards or away from greater 'communicative transparency' in their practices.
These tendencies are crucial. But the ideal-norm of 'perfect transparency' is
an empirical impossibility. The reason is clear the moment we examine the
social and historical foundations of these communications systems. Hans .
Dreitzel, in a volume devoted to "Patterns of Communicative Behaviour",’
has recently reminded us that,
In fact communicative behaviour rests on work and power 
relations as well as on language; and if we comprehend 
the typification schemes of language as the most funda­
mental basic rules of everyday life, we also have to 
notice that even language is subject- to distortions 
caused by the conditions of our life..the social world 
is not only structured by language but also by the 
modes and forces of material production and by the 
systems of domination.
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Of course, there must be some degree of reciprocity between the encoding
and decoding ends of the communicative chain, or else, literally, audiences
would not understand what the broadcasters were talking about, and social
incomprehension would reign. This is clearly not the case. However, we have
already advanced a little when we recognize that public communication between
broadcasters and their audiences requires two linked but separate acts: the
act of ’encoding' the television or radio message, and the act of 'decoding'
(M
and interpreting it. These are linked, but not" immediately identical' moments
in the communication process. The 'encoding' process is very largely performed
by the professional broadcasting elites, with their own social formation,
their own selective recruitment, their own social position, their own
connections to and perspectives on power, their own professional competences
and routines, their own professional ideologies. The 'decoding' process is«* *
performed by the heterogeneous, complexly-structured 'mass audiences', standing
in their own relation to the unequal distribution of social, economic and culture
power, with their own connections to and perspectives on the system of power
as a whole. 'Cultural power', we will remember, includes the differential
acquisition by the different strata of the population of the competence to
i
■ v
speak, transmit, verbalize and comprehend - a form of 'power' directly relevant 
to the capacity to 'communicate', and fundamentally shaped and distributed, in 
our kinds of society, by the education system.
The notion, then, that we are all 'free and equal' members of the 
communicative structures, with an equal competence of 'speech', and an equal
A
'right of access' is a mystification. Of course, in the liberal mass democracies,
the structured gaps between those who dominate in the public communications
f
systems, and those who receive are not as wide as they were in previous historical 
epochs. In the feudal period, the great majority exercised the right, acquired 
th6 competence and had the power to 'speak' almost exclusively to those small, 
intimate 'publics' which composed their immediate, face-to-face communities:
•public* communications, in our sense - whether in the form of royal pro­
clamations, papal bulls, legislative enactments or sermons - were exclusively 
the preserve of very small elites. What has altered this situation is not, 
simply, a growth in the technology of communications. Fundamentally, wider 
and wider sections of the population have gradually, and through struggle, won 
their way into the framework of civil and political society: and thus, gradually, 
the. new technical means have been adapted to this changed balance of ..power.
The communicators, in a modern society, are more explicitly mediators than they 
were in feudal societies: they must draw their materials, their events, their 
concerns, in part from the audiences which they address - they 'play back' the 
experiences of the audience to the audience, in addition to their other functions 
such as bringing news about one audience to another, or providing the spectacle 
of entertainment for audiences as a whole. In this sense, as Philip':Elliott^ 
has recently demonstrated, the audience progressively plays the role, in modern 
communications, both of source and receiver. But this is still not the same 
thing as the audience 'communicating'. The process must still pass through the 
mediating structures of broadcasting itself: the broadcasters must select (and 
reject), transform into 'messages' (encode), develop formats, shape contents 
for the communicative circuit to be completed from audience to audience. Thus, 
though the 'production' and 'consumption' of media content are linked, and 
each is required for the production of the other., they are linked in the manner 
of mediations in a process. The opposite ends of the communicative process 
"require an intermediary in order to form a unity, and the effectiveness of this 
intermediary (and hence the maintenance of the whole) is dependent on.certain 
conditions which may or may not be p r e s e n t . I t  is in and through that
mediation - crucially, for our purposes, the originating functions qf the
<»
broadcasters in initiating the circle of.communications - that systematic
distortions enter the chain,
(7)Thus, when Habermas, in formulating certain criteria for 'normal 
communication', says that "Normal communication conforms to inter-subjectively
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recognizable rules", we can agree. The television message conforms to the 
norms of ordinary language, which, as we know, is impossible without the 
operation of codes which are shared between those who produce and those who 
interpret messages. But when he adds that "The communicated meanings are 
identical for all members of the language community", we must ask how the 
term, "identical" there is to be understood. It may refer, in a common-sense 
way, to the matter of most audiences, most of the time, "for all practical 
purposes", sharing a set of codes with the communicators, which enable them, 
denotatively, to recognize and interpret the lexical and visual items which 
constitute the message. Even here, total identity does not exist. There is 
empirical evidence to suggest that audiences, literally, do not comprehend 
everything that is said or shown to them, even at the denotative level. And 
we should not be surprised by that finding. Recent work on the language of tl 
classroom powerfully suggests the different types of coding and registration
which operate, even in the intimate situation of the teaching situation, betv
(8^
teachers and pupils. We know that the ’competence' to speak is quite un­
equally distributed as between different classes and groups in the population. 
How much more so will this mis-match between 'encoding' and 'decoding' be the 
case in the situation of mass communications. What is more, it is clear that 
social communications almost never function at the 'denotative' level alone.
In social communication, every act of literal identification is also an act of 
social identification. Radio or television communication cannot literally 
signify a theme, topic or event without at the same time, explicitly or 
implicitly,' assigning it to its context, giving it a position within the range 
of social and cultural identifications which help us to 'map out the world' in 
comprehensible terms. "Once we name our object under some description, then in
so denoting that we point to the qualities and properties which they have and
(9)which they may exemplify". Cicourel has recently reminded us that,
The reciprocity of perspectives rule or interpretive 
procedure cannot operate unless additional rules or 
sub-routines accompany its use. • One sub-routine consists 
of the actor's ability to treat a given lexical item
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category or phrase as an index of larger networks of 
meaning, as in normative developments of disease cate­
gories, colour categories and kinship terms. The appear­
ance of a particular lexical item presumes the speaker 
intended a larger set, and assumes the hearer 'fills in' 
the larger set when deciding its meaning.
At this level of contextual or 'connotative' interpretation, where the 
operation of what Cicourel has called "the et cetera rule" is absolutely 
crucial, the ideal of 'perfect reciprocity' recedes even further. Indeed, 
it is masked, even in Cicourel's formulation, by the deceptive use of the 
term "normative". In what sense are the categories of disease, colour or 
kinship "normative"? We certainly know that they are subject to enormous 
cultural variation, as between one society and another. Within any one 
culture, the colour spectrum or (less certainly) kinship categories may 
command very wide, perhaps near-universal, consensus. A television play 
can identify two actors as representing 'mother' and 'son' with a fair 
degree of certainty that anyone watching will 'understand' what kinship 
system is here invoked. However, the viewer of a more specialist kind of 
television programme, say about a tribal society, in which the presenter uses 
the term "mother's brother" would be instantly at sea, unless further, contextual 
elaboration were provided. For this term 'indexes' kinship systems, which 
employ some of the same terms as those with which we are familiar, but where 
the terms have quite different significance: and a whole specialized language 
and debate, in which only some ethnologists are at all 'competent', is required 
before the lay-audience can comprehend what is being said and shown. And this 
is a relatively simple example, where the boundary between what will be known 
sind what is unknown is reasonably clear.
News, documentary and current affairs programmes on television and radio, 
for example, which constantly signify complex political situations with which 
the audience is not familiar in any detail, deal with far more shaded and 
ambiguous areas, where the line between 'full comprehension', 'partial com-
of 'disease' are not as clear-cut or 'normative' as Cicourel supposes. In.the
prehension' and 'in-comprehension' is extremely hard to draw.
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skilled medical fraternity, the basic categories of disease may be fairly 
firmly established; but a very long apprenticeship is required before young 
internees acquire the 'competence' to assign medical symptoms to their 
proper category. Both the skilled practice of diagnosis, and the doctor- 
patient interview (the communicative foundation of general medical practice) 
consist of the 'interpretive work' required to assign the 'incompetent' 
patients groans, moans, pains and grimaces to their 'normative category': 
and what we might call 'category mistakes' are crucial' It has sometimes 
been said that doctors present themselves to their patients in a gruff and 
professional manner, in order to set the patient's mind at rest, while 'covering' 
for the inevitably hit-and-miss procedures of which a great deal of diagnosis 
consists. Goffman^^ has remarked something similar of the 'joking relation­
ships ' and ironic distance which characteristically accompanies the work of 
the surgeon in the operating theatre. Alternatively, we may think of the 
enormous discrepancies which currently exist between the medically-defined 
categories of 'cancer', and the general audience's understanding of (and deep 
fears about) the term. Or of the v/ay the distorted syntactic structures of 
the speech of certain patients labelled 'mentally ill', have been assigned to the 
disease category, 'schizophrenia'; and of the major controversies, within 
the psychotherapeutic community and the general public, which this normative 
assignment has stirred up. So, once we have brought the connotative.and 
contextualizing aspects of social communication into view, it becomes more 
and'more difficult to assume any degree of 'perfect reciprocity' between the 
communicators and the audiences.
Things, of course, can be clarified, explained: broadcasters themselves 
can take some responsibility for ' de-con.textualizing' their own content on 
behalf of their publics. But then, this is' precisely where some of the 
'systematic distortions' we referred to earlier begin to arise. For television 
or radio's "mode of identifying social reality." is not and cannot be a wholly 
neutral and objective process. We have to decide what the sources ape of the
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contextual interpretations and identifications which television or radio 
regularly employs (an analysis which leads us from language proper into 
structures, power and ideologies), and whether such contexts are indeed 
wholly symmetrical with those employed by their audiences, before communication 
without distortion can become an operational (rather than an ideological) 
concept. We must bear in mind that, in the sphere of political, social and 
current affairs broadcasting, the media are constantly and regularly dealing 
with 'problematic situations' whose 'meaning* is not at all clear-cut, even 
to the experts, and about which there is, rarely, if ever, one, clear, unequivocal 
arid unproblematic context or explanation. The media do not, in their general 
programming, deal with categories and contexts as defined or wellbounded as 
those of the colour spectrum. It is one thing for a news broadcast to show 
pictures of a military coup against a constitutional government, including 
the bombing of, say, the House of Assembly. It is quite another question for the 
foreign affairs correspondent to assign that event, those pictures, to some 
contextual category of explanation, along the lines of "A strong government 
intervened today to correct the country's inflationary spiral".
Yet, of course, once we have been offered the witnessed account of that 
day's event, precisely what is at issue is: in what framework of. understanding 
can these events be understood? What factors led up to them? What unseen 
forces prepared it? What logic of events produced the. bombing-as-an-event?
And what consequences lead from it? Does it affect the balance of political 
power in the continent? the future of constitutionally elected governments? 
the possibilities of peaceful as against armed revolutionary change in societies 
of this type? In fact, the brief, apparently 'factual', report in the tele-cast, 
indexes these further contexts, points to them as the necessary 'deep-structure' 
of the event. The 'meaning' of: the event is not accessible to the viewer 
without that .deep-structure. 'Indeed, not only will such questions appear 
naturally to 'follow on'.: some provisional,-implicit answers to them will 
already be present, already embedded, in the the limited signification which
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the event had achieved in the headline news. To note that one kind of 
regime has ended, and smother replaced it, in the manner sho-wn, is to signify 
a number of possible contexts in which such a sequence of events 'makes sense'. 
It is precisely to signify the event, to identify it, to 'make it mean' 
something, socially and historically. Every news event is already, if 
incompletely, assigned to a context which 'explains it'. The broadcaster, or 
his reporter and camera-man in the field, must already have such a context in 
mind in order to know what to film, which to select and send back to the editor, 
which to include in the broadcast. As more becomes known, such contexts may 
be expanded and refined: they may even be modified. But no primary sig­
nification can occur without them. In short, where social communication is 
concerned, it is impossible to proceed without 'interpretive work', without 
the operation of indexical or 'et cetera1 rules. The very choice of one set
of images over another to signify 'what happened there yesterday' involves the
(ll)use of interpretive codes.
- l o ­
ll
News, current affairs and documentary broadcasting, on radio and 
television, represent, taken together, a massive area of public broadcasting. 
Together with the national press, these media, organized as public commun­
ications systems, crucially intersect, on the one side, with politics, 
government, power and the state, and on the other side, with what we might 
call the ’public discourse’ amongst the audience at large about questions of 
national and international significance. Major broadcasting resources, in 
terms of personnel, economic and technical resources, programme production 
and transmission time are devoted to this broadcasting domain. In political 
terms, it represents the pivotal sector of social communications. It is the 
point at which the broadcasters and their institutions mediate - hold the 
pass, command the communicative channels - between the elites of power (social, 
economic, political, cultural) and the mass audience. This mediation is 
exercised in different ways, and in different formats. The news brings the 
audience the raw and truncated signification of 'events', at home and abroad: 
it is limited, largely, to foreground accounts, and to a very short time span. 
In current affairs broadcasting, the experts and the major personal and 
institutional participants in those events appear in more extended form: 
giving more detailed, expert, 'background' accounts, or arguing and contesting 
the meaning and significance of the events which the news has reported. In the 
documentary area, the broadcasting professionals take the responsibility for 
compiling accounts or 'filmed investigations' of events and problems which 
have either already surfaced in the news, or which are judged by them to be 
potential 'news-events', or edging into news visibility. Foreground accounts: 
background reports and investigations: organized controversy, amd discussion: 
broadly speaking, these are the three structures to public broadcasting which 
sustain the domain of 'political broadcasting*. (Particular formats, of course, 
differ and vary widely from channel to channel, programme to programme).
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Now in all these areas of social communication, a fundamental a-symmetry 
exists between those who shape events, participate actively in them, those whip 
have skilled and expert knowledge about events, and those who have 'privelegea 
access' to events and participants in order to report on and communicate abort 
them: and, on the other hand, the great majorities and minorities of the 'nasc 
audience*, who do not directly participate in events (even when they are 
directly affected by them), who have no expert knowledge about them, and who have
no privileged right of access to information and personnel. In this doiain,*
the broadcasters are responsible for initiating communication about evnts: 
they select the events on which they report or around which they orgaiize discus­
sion: they select the institutional persons and the experts who speak about 
or speak to an issue: they define the agenda of ’significant issuesthey 
’encode' those events in appropriate formats: they help to define the terms 
in which the events will be presented or debated: and they transmit, -
Nov/ the events which constitute the 'subject-matter' of broadcasting 
in this domain are usually new, dramatic, often unexpected and unprecLcted 
events, events of a 'problematic' kind, which breach or disturb our. common-
sense expectations about the social order, our 'taken-for-granted' sense of
(12)'how the world is'. In a sense, these are the category-requirements of 
the whole area of news, and its subordinate areas (current affairs,.documentary, 
etc): it is news because it is new; because it fundamentally, dramatically, 
disturbs or has the potential to disturb the on-going social order (local,- - 
national or inter-national). News can breach our 'normal' expectations about 
the world in different ways. It can represent an event in the world the like 
of which we have never seen before (the first moon landing): it can represent 
a new and unexpected turn in events (the sudden renewal of Israel-Arab 
hostilities): it can represent a slight modification-or development in an 
on-going process of change (the latest phase in a government's anti-inflation 
policy): it can bring us 'news' about everyday events in one part of the world 
which are, however, 'news to us' (reports of tribal life in New Guinea). What 
is common to all these kinds of events i3 the fact that they are to some degree
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’problematic', and therefore their 'meaning' is not transparently given in 
them. No matter how much 'coverage' we are given, we always need more 
information if we are to understnad 'fully' what is going on. If the event 
is shown or reported on at first hand, we also need to know whether it is an 
isolated or general development, whether its outcome has been resolved or is 
still in doubt. If the event is part of an unfolding chain of events, we need 
to know what that long-term process is, what are the deep-structures which have 
brought it about, what its indirect consequences, long-term, will be. If the 
event is wholly unexpected, we need to know why we were not led to expect it, 
what unforseen and unpredicted or unreported factors had been, all the while, 
preparing its eventuality. If it is really new or really strange, we will need 
a great deal of contextual information before we can say we 'really understand' 
what is happening. And all news-events, of whatever kind, require to be 'set 
in context' (an event, like a term in a discourse, cannot signify on its own), 
and presume or entail 'an explanation'. Of course, the hostilities in the 
Middle East are part of the larger, longer struggle between... Of course, 
the attack was made there, or then, because.. The whole process of social 
communication, we would argue, implies an interpretive, contextualizing 
discourse. But this is especially true of the whole domain of news and 
'political communications' in general. The discourses by means of which the 
broadcasters translate historical events in the 'real world' into 'communicative 
events' (messages of one kind or another) are, fundamentally, indexical discourses 
in Cicourel's sense. They depend on the use of connotative codes, by means 
of which "larger networks of meaning" are indexed; and on the interpretive work 
which broadcasters must do to resolve events which seem intrinsically 
'meaningless' (or whose 'meaning' is incomplete), into categories, explanatory 
contexts which 'make them mean something' in more than a merely-literal sense. 
Likewise, the viewer must either already understand the context in which the 
event is being signified, or must be offered some 'explanatory•context' so that 
he, too, can 'resolve' the event meaningfully. If the media can be said to
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shape the public debate, to mould popular consciousness about issues, it is 
not only because they have become the major, and most credible source, of 
literal information about the world. It is because they also exercise the 
function of connecting discrete events with one another: they build or 'map* 
events into larger, wider, frameworks of meaning, so that viewers come, not
i
simply to 'know what is happening', but to construct from that knowledge 
"pictures of the world", scenarios of action.
The choice of frameworks and categories, the initial 'definitions of 
the situation', are, of course, principally initiated by, and rest with the 
broadcasters. The activity of comprehending and 'decoding' by the audience is 
conducted on terrain which the broadcasters first define and delimit. In so 
far as audiences do not question the framework of assumptions within which 
these primary significations are made, they 'interpret' within the hegemonic 
'definitions of the situation' which the broadcasters provide. In other cases 
they may relate the 'global' definitions which the media provide to their own, 
more situated position: or they may try to 'make sense' of the media signifi­
cations, while recognizing that 'things look somewhat different' if one is an 
ordinary member of the public and not one of the experts or history-makers.
In that case, they can be said to 'negotiate meanings', within the outer 
determinations of the hegemonic definitions they have been offered. It is 
also possible for audiences to fully comprehend how and why media professionals, 
experts and accredited witnesses see an event that way, but nevertheless, refuse 
that 'reading' of events, and resolve meanings in a contradictory way. In that 
case, they refuse or refute the 'definitions of the situation' with which they
are provided, and bring their own de-coding codes into play. These we may
( 1*0call 'oppositional* readings. Because the 'encoding* and 'decoding'
moments in the communicative chain are not identical, but differentiated 
moments in a complexly unified process, the 'perfect transmission' of meanings 
from broadcasting source to audience is, or can potentially be, subject to 
further systematic skewing. It would not be correct to conceive of these
/
simply as 'obstacles to communication': kinks in the communication chain, which 
ought to be straightened out. For these differential 'readings' arise from 
the fact that events are interpretible in more than one framework or context: 
different groups and classes of people will bring different explanatory frameworks 
to bear, depending on their social position, their interests, place in the 
hierarchy of power, and so on. If we were to remove 'obstacles to communication' 
of this kind, all that this would ensure would be that the hegemonic definitions 
of events by the powerful and the privileged would reign tout court. And this 
would entail the premise that the views of the world provided by the powerful 
elites are always correct: that, in relation to events, all the different 
groups and classes in society have or ought to have only one viewpoint. It 
would mean, in short, that only the dominant ideology should prevail. If the 
military coup referred to above is interpreted by a friendly government as 
'legitimate and necessary', and the media - taking the impress of elite opinion -• 
signifies the events of the coup in that way, then it is a positive virtue of 
the system (not a weakness or obstacle) that some groups, at least, should 
have the residual right to give those events an alternative, oppositional 
reading. Otherwise, the communications system would function in a unilateral 
and uncontested way, merely to reproduce the hegemonic ideology, as an 
instrument to pacify structural conflict. In such a situation, a 'perfect 
communications system' - one without obstacles - would itself become the greatest 
obstacle to communication.
We know of no mass communications systems which are 'perfectly transparent* 
in this way. Mass media systems have to deal with a variety of topics and 
events, and have to reflect something more than the 'dominantviewpoint', so 
that they generally display the characteristics of what Enzensberger has called 
"leaky systems". Moreover, as we shall see below, there are few systems in 
which the definitions of the powerful pass, without any qualification or 
modification or challenge, straight into the media and are simply reproduced 
by its professionals. The connections which the media form with the elites of
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power are extremely complex, and contradictions - of interest, outlook and 
interpretation - frequently arise between them. Further, media professionals 
work within conflicting criteria: if, on the one side, they must be sensitive 
to .the way the powerful are defining events, they also have, and recognize, 
a duty to ’inform the public', to try to get to the 'truth' about events, even 
when this conflicts with the official signification of them. Although there 
is rarely anything so simple as the 'objective truth' about a historical event, 
the requirement to be 'objective' is a useful 'operational fiction', which tends 
to open gaps between the accounts which the professionals offer and the 
interpretations which politicians or administrators hope will prevail. Further, 
the media systems we are describing operate within the political structure of 
a formal democracy. So the obligation to reflect, even within those limited 
terms, the viewpoint of critics or 'the opposition', as well as the viewpoint 
of those in power, is not merely at their discretion: it is usually formally 
enshrined in their terms of reference - the requirement that there should be 
'balance' in the viewpoints expressed when a topic is controversial. There 
are, then, various structural features of these systems which prevent them 
from unilaterally reproducing, without contradiction, the hegemonic ideology. 
Perfectly transparent, unilateral, communication can only exist in the (extremely 
rare) limiting case of the perfectly censored medium!'^
It would be wrong, however, to interpret this as producing a state of 
perfect pluralism where the dominant mass media systems are concerned. If the 
hegemonic viewpoint doao not, unilaterally, have its way at all times, this 
does not mean that the media serve all viewpoints equally: there is no 'perfect 
competition' in the market of public opinions, where each individual member of 
the audience has an equally open chance of structuring the public discourse. 
Despite the requirements of 'objectivity', 'balance', 'impartiality?, etc, the 
media remain oriented within the framework of power: they are part of a 
political and social system which is 'structured in dominance'. Objectivity, 
impartiality and balance are exercised within a framework; and that framework is
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one which, overall, the powerful, not the powerless - elites, not audiences - 
crucially define. The commitment of the media to the reflection of !more than 
one viewpoint' does not in any way contradict the media's overall tendency to 
"reproduce the hegemonic ideology, with all its contradict ions. For the
hegemonic ideology, in the terms in which we are discussing it, is, precisely, 
the ideology of liberal class-societies: that is to say, one in which the 
•national interest' is identified with, and is seen to proceed via, the 
structured 'clash' of opposing viewpoints. These opposing viewpoints are, 
of course, at another level, precisely united in their fundamental loyalty to 
the structures of constraint - the rule of law, constitutional legality, the 
two-party parliamentary structure, etc - which permit them to 'oppose'. So 
that media systems which thrive on controversy, the clash of opposing viewpoints, 
'open discussion', free debate, and so on, may nevertheless be said, at another 
level, to be substantiating and reproducing the 'mode of reality' of the State, 
without these two things standing in any kind of open contradiction. In the 
British broadcasting system, for example, the two television channels are 
required, both by practice and by their governing charters, to give.'equal time' 
to the viewpoints of the two major political parties on any topic which is 
controversial. But this clash of opposing opinions is framed by the two party- 
system itself, by the political structure of Her Majesty's Government/Her 
Majesty's Loyal Opposition, by the rule of law and constitutional precedent, as 
well as by a whole number of working definitions as to what does and what does 
not constitute 'politics'. A point of view which arises outside the framework 
of discussion defined by the two major parliamentary parties has far less 'right 
of access' to time and to debate on the media: indeed, if such a point of view 
is one which challenges the very terms v/hich Government and Opposition have 
agreed to operate, it has a difficult time getting the media to recognize 
its viewpoint as 'political' at sill. The flow of communications in.the society 
is thus structured, not only by the explanatory frameworks within which the 
media signify events, but at the previous stage: the stage at which events and
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topics become visible to the media at all, the stage at which an event is defined 
as 'signifiable'. Indeed, the two types of structuring - the one when the 
message arises, and the one when the message is transmitted - are deeply 
interconnected, because the media will tend to take-over, from the political 
elites, a way of perceiving an event, as well as a way of explaining or 
contextualizing it.
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III
Let us try to draw together the points we have been making, and 
attempt to elaborate them in terms of a model and an example. The example 
chosen is the recent British legislation, in the form of an Industrial 
Relations Bill, which delimits the recourse to strike action in industrial 
disputes between employers and employees or unions, institutionalizes an 
enforced 'cooling off period in any dispute before industrial action can be 
taken, and brings into play for the first time in British industrial relations 
an Industrial Court with wide-ranging powers. The model developed below is based 
on a detailed study of the media coverage of the introduction and immediate 
consequences of this piece of controversial legislation, but no attempt has 
been made here to refer to particular programmes. Instead, the aim is to try 
to establish the various stages in the 'public signification' of this set of 
events, and thus to pin-point the characteristic manner in which 'communication' 
about an event of this order is structured.
The passage of the Industrial Relations Bill was not, of course, a 
one-off event. It arose within a prolonged debate, which has racked and 
divided the society for nearly ten years, about the need for some fundamental 
change in the structure of industrial relations in Britain: an argument which 
pin-pointed the so-called 'uncontrolled' level of wage-demands by the unions, 
and the number of working days lost through strikes as two of the principal 
factors producing an inflationary spiral in the economy, and generally weakening 
Britain's economic position. The Labour Government itself proposed to legislate 
in a rather similar manner, and this plan was only abandoned at the last moment 
in return for a pledge by the unions to exercise their own 'voluntary' restraints 
it provoked widespread debate in itself, and serious conflicts of opinion 
between the Labour Government and the unions, as well as in the country at 
large. We cannot deal with this 'background' in our model. But it is important 
to bear in mind that events of the kind we will try to take into account,
steaming from the introduction of legislation by the Conservative Government,
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already have a complex pre-history: they enter a highly structured field of 
discourse, in which opinions, of both an expert and lay kind, have already 
been mobilized and polarised. V/e should note, however, that what forms the 
background to the process we shall attempt to detail, is in no sense a set 
of -’neutral facts', but a set of highly-contradictory interpretations.
There may be 'further facts', constituting some neutral, informational ground, 
which the media - in their search for an 'objective' standpoint - could try 
to occupy; but, it would be virtually impossible to reconstruct the public 
debate about the issue around them, even if they could be found. Already, 
we are dealing with fundamentally contradictory explanatory frameworks. For 
example, is British post-war inflation due to a 'wages-push*, or have wages 
simply allowed working people to keep up with inflation? Does Britain lose 
more days in strikes than other industrial nations, and, if so, is this a 
structural or an incidental factor in her post-war economic performance?
The issue of the Government's Industrial Relations Bill (IRB), then, 
does not arise 'cold'. The debate has already been, to some degree, 
pre-structured. However, we can, for analytic purposes, bracket these for 
the moment, and consider the position once the preliminary stages are over 
and legislation is introduced.
' A. It is, of course, 'decisions' of this precise and clear-cut kind, 
which meet the first requirements of news. The topicality of the issue, its 
wide-ranging significance for the society, its short and long term consequences, 
the 'drama' connected with the event - these meet the criteria of 'news 
worthiness', and make the event visible, first, to the media via the structure 
of 'news values'. That is to say, the decision clearly commands the attention 
of the newsmen and news editors, and thus time in the news bulletins, so to 
speak, from the outside. Its position in the day's agenda of issues is 
determined by the political elites and governmental institutions who take the 
decision and act, in the first place. It passes straight into the media, and 
acquires there its first media visibility, not essentially because newsmen
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have views, one way or another, about industrial relations, but because news 
men do their work within the framework of the professional routines and 
values of 'news making': it is the professional criteria and practices 
of news-making, not the political beliefs of news-men, which frame the 
crucial passage of the event from the political to the broadcasting domains.
The media take over and reproduce the 'agenda of issues' established by the 
political elites as a consequence of the structural nexus which binds 
broadcasting to politics and power, not as a consequence of the personal 
inclinations and biases of media personnel.
The connections between broadcasting and the political elites are not 
all of this 'extrinsic' kind. The IE3 has been promul.’ ,ted in Parliament,
* by major political speeches, and by official Cabinet or Government announce­
ments. These are, of course, the regular sources of political information ai 
of unofficial 'briefings' for those media professionals and correspondents 
v/ho regularly report on the political affairs of the nation. The 'informati 
thus becomes accessible to the media along 'channels' already well worn with 
use. But further, the Government will not propose legislation of this far- 
reaching and controversial a kind 'neutrally'. Its spokesmen will marshall 
the case for legislation with all the skill at their command. For example, 
they win take up interpretations of the economic situation favourable to 
legislation (i.e. wages do cause inflation, strikes do weaken the economy), 
and build them into their 'case'. So that, from the very moment that the 
decision is made and legislation introduced, the fact of legislation and the 
'definitions of the powerful* are already in play. It is the fact of legislatic 
together with the favourable promulgation or interpretation of that fact, which 
constitutes the 'event' for the media newsmen. Typically, in the first televisii 
newscast, there will be a 'report' by the news reader prepared by the newsroom; 
a brief extract of an interview with the Prime Minister after the decision 
has been announced to the House; in which, inevitably, he will 'present the 
bare bones of the case for' the way the Government has acted. This,will be
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'balanced' by a brief extract from an interview with, say, the Leader of the 
Opposition, containing a resume of the terms in which the Opposition will 
oppose the legislation: and, probably, an 'expert' assessment of its immediate 
consequences by the media's political correspondent. In short, the media 
reproduce the event, already presignified: and they do this because they obey 
the requirement on them to report 'impartially' what the decision-makers say 
and do, and because the structure of news values orient them, in certain 
predictable.and practised ways, to these privileged sources of action and 
information. A persuasive account of this piece of legislation is now in the 
public domain: so are the dominant terms in which it is to be opposed within 
the framework of parliamentary opposition. This constitutes-the delimited 
terrain, the first and primary signification of the event. All other, and 
further significations of the event, within and outside the media, will con­
stitute reproductions of, modifications of, extensions of, attempts to change 
the terms-of-reference of, that primary signification. Let us note that, so 
far, the only function of the media in the process of public signification has 
been to be scrupulously 'objective', 'impartial', 'balanced', 'neutral' and 
'informed'.
B. The event now has a 'news life' within the media. Later bulletins 
will amplify the event-as-news, and report on new developments. Given the 
extensive function of news coverage provided by the media, this continuing 
news coverage will form a continuing ground-bass to the signification, of the 
event so far as the public is-concerned. It can only be displaced (a) if 
significant new developments in the same issue gradually change the terms of 
the coverage: or if (b) it is displaced by 'other news' of a different and 
more dramatic kind. . ....
But we must pass to the second stage. The media do not only report 
the event. They have the duty to organize the public debate about the issue. 
There are two sides to this, one passive or reflective, one more active. The 
new legislation is now actively debated in different political forums: in
t
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Parliament, in political circles, in the unions, and the employers organizations, 
and by academic and intellectual experts. In its reports, the media will continue 
to reflect the passage of the event within these defined circles. But the 
media have also become responsible for organizing their own debate about the 
issue. And here the IRB passes from the keeping of the newsroom and its 
attendant 'hews values' into what is normally defined as 'current affairs'.
How will a 'current affairs' discussion on the media on this question be 
constructed? By law, practice and custom, the Government, which has taken 
the initiative in the matter, have a right to the debate: to put their point 
of view smd marshall the argument. Here, we might say, the Government is 
absolutely accessed: it is unthinkable that a Government spokesman should not 
appear. He is, of course, also subject to be interviewed and questioned. Here 
the media professional - interviewers, chairmen of discussion, etc - are no 
longer performing the strictly neutral role of the 'reporter': he is the skilled 
questionner, with a right to put questions Ci.e. initiate debate) and seek answers. 
His 'right' to do so rests fundamentally on the premise that all political 
decisions in this society are open to responsible question (he will be both 
questioning and responsible). But the role of 'tough interviewer' is, 
finally, legitimated because viewers - the general public - cannot, (given the 
restricted nature of the medium) put questions themselves; so that the professional 
interviewer must perform a role on behalf of the public. He invokes the lack g 
of access by the public, and his role as mediator between power and 'the people', 
to legitimate his otherwise awkward role. He can only perform a really critical 
task vis-a-vis his interviewee, an official, spokesman, by tacitly invoking 
the 'common sense' viewpoint of the 'ordinary viewer'. He puts to the Cabinet 
Minister questions he supposes the raan-in-the-street would have put to him, 
had he had the chance. This is indeed an active mediating role: and it is 
perhaps here that the media first, in any substantial way, begin,to interpose 
their own definitions of the situation on those definitions which the political
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elites have already signified* and which the media have faithfully and accurately 
•reported'. But we must note that, in passing from the legitimate right to 
•report' fully and accurately, to the legitimate right to 'enter into a 
controlled debate' with the politicians, the media interviewer in constrained in 
at least three different ways: (a) he must elicit the Minister's view of the 
situation first, before he can probe it: to some degree, he, too, operates from 
a base-line within the pre-definitions of the question; (b) he cannot roam too 
far* outside the kinds of questions 'everyone' will clearly see to be those 
which 'ordinary people' would have wanted to put: otherwise, he will be accused 
of partisanship. Though the viewer is not actually present, a certain typification 
of the viewer - as an 'ordinary bloke, with a lot of common sense questions, but 
not an extremist' - serves to modulate the interviewers performance of his role;
(c) he is governed by the 'rules of conduct' of polite and rational debate: 
he cannot lose his temper, employ debating tricks, take too much advantage of 
his interviewee's discomfiture, etc. In short, the media now begin to amplify 
and expand the 'definitions of the situation' which structure the topic: but 
they do so by operating within the terrain largely defined by the dominant 
institutions, though they function 'critically' in relation to that terrain.
The media interviewer will more frequently follow a point made by the Minister, 
by a question critical of that point, then he v/ill initiate a line of questions 
altogether outside the limits in which his interviewee is operating. Indeed, 
his legitimacy to be 'tough' is regulated to some degree by the degree of 
toughness v/ith which the Minister puts his point of view. The logics-in-use 
which govern interviews of this type appear to be wide open, but in fact they 
are very tightly constructed. They tend, overall, to push the interviewer 
towards v/hat we might call the 'test of pragmatic effectiveness'. His strongest 
criticism (without overstepping th» boundaries of his role) can be mounted 
from the 'common-sense' position, "will it work"? Pragma Li© ■i-tj - c
order, naturally, operates within the framework of a higher rationality, v/hich 
hardly ever surfaces. It produces an interviewing practice which is extremely 
'tough', within its limitst and creates the strong impression that 'the Minister
was not allowed to get away with anything'. This crucial practice in media 
signification of public events is so little studied that it is worth illustrating, 
in syllogistic form:
A. "We have had to act against strikes in the national interest"
Q. "Yes, but are you sure this legislation won't lead to even more strikes?"
(Premise: 'everyone agrees it is right to halt strikes: the question is,
'how'?)
A. !'If we can control the rising level of wages, then we can begin to 
get prices down"
Q. "But how long can you expect a virtual freeze on wages?"
or
Q. "But how can you ensure that retailers will hold prices at their 
current level?'
(Premise: price inflation is due to immoderate wage demands)
(Premise: since we are all consumers, if you could control prices 
then everyone would support your policy)
We must note that all these hypothetical exchanges, contain, as their
necessary deep-structure, some pre-embedded definitions of the situation, quite
apart from the specific 'Premises' we have indicated. Thus, for example, all
of them assume that 'we' are united, in an equal way, as a nation and as consumers,
and will judge the legislation from that position, in terms of its effectiveness
in securing a 'national interest' whose content we all know and subscribe to,
and have an equal share in. They tacitly rule out the alternative assumption:
that we are divided, as a nation, between those who employ and those who sell
their labour, and thus have a differential relation to 'the national interest',
which tends to operate more in the interest of some than of others. The political
spokesman will frame his case within the premise of 'the national interest',
because it allows him to make the widest possible appeal for support, and to
build coalitions of support across classes and parties. The interviewer has
'taken over' this ideological signification as the 'operational' premise of his
conversation with power. The passage"of the hegemonic definitions continues to
i . ■’ *
operate, so to speak, via the structures and the logics, but 'behind men's backs'.
C. But here a new criterion enters: that of 'balance'. If the Minister 
has the 'right of debate' on the media, the criterion of 'balance' ensures that
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his Opposition Shadow Minister has the 'right of reply’. Not only will ’the 
two sides' be represented, but they will tend to be represented by spokesmen 
of more or less equal political weight. The Shadow Minister, too, may be 
subject to 'questioning' (see above), before the discussion becomes more open.
The sequence here is not random but structured. 'Debate' in the media requires 
two sides and a ’neutral’ chairman or interviewer: political debate of this order 
requires, at least, Government, Opposition and professional Chairman (who, 
apart from the professional tasks of 'keeping the discussion moving’, ’covering 
the topics', 'putting supplementary questions', also has the formal role of 
holding the ring for the debate to unfold: the rules of rational argument, fair 
allocation of time to each side, the reasonableness of the exchanges, and the 
other tasks of studio management). In a debate of this importance, the operatioi 
of the criterion of 'balance' ensures the presence, not only of political 
spokesmen from the Parties, but of 'institutional spokesmen', from the Trades 
Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry. The representatives 
of these institutions have structured access here, as accredited spokesmen, 
not only because the specific issue of the IEB directly affects their position, 
but because, on a whole range of issues, the media consider that the public 
debate must be shared between the dominant major institutions in the national 
life. Outside of the formal political representatives of the majority, the media 
acknowledge that, in complex, class democracies, the major institutional 
organizations wield critical and massive social power, and shape decisions in 
ways not open to 'ordinary people'. So, progressively, the institutional 
spokesmen have gained a 'right to participate in the debate' when the media 
organize the discussion, though this is largely by practice and custom rather 
than (as is the case with political matters) by law.
The topic has now been structured: the 'debate■ can begin. The major 
participants have been 'produced', so to speak, by the complex processes which 
link the media to the major sources of power in the society, and this link is 
mediated, specifically, by what we might call the legitimate structure of access.
Access is not - as has sometimes seemed to be the case in recent debates - a 
matter of minority participation in broadcasting, or the extension of some right 
to participate to groups and individuals who do not regularly appear. It is, 
first and foremost, the existing, regular, systematic structure of access: the 
institutions, groups, personnel who regularly and of right appear and define, 
the groups who cannot be left out. It is only then, and more residually, a 
question of the subordinate ’rights' of those who have been 'left out', or 
of those who can 'win their way, by consent or struggle', into visibility. Thus 
we must know what the structure of access is and the 'informal rules' by which 
it is operated: and then, what this structure of access does to the structuring 
of the topic as a communicative event: before we can bring into view the 
limited efforts and successes of those outside the consensus of access to 
modify the structure in some way. The demands of those 'without access' must be 
understood, first, in terms of its 'absent' opposite: the systematic 'over­
accessing' of certain groups in the society. Only then can the structuring of 
communications be adequately produced as an object of study, reflection and 
action.
Let us observe certain features of the structuring of the topic as we 
have outlined it so far. The structures ensure that more than one viewpoint 
will be present in the public debate in the media. They also ensure what 
range of voices and viewpoints, what institutional weightings, will be present 
in the signification of any controversial topic. They ensure the terms in which 
the topic will be elaborated, and the terrain across which the 'debate' will 
range. No single set of terms will unilaterally prevail: but the dominantly 
defined terms and limits within which controversy is engendered are not 
infinite - they remain 'structured in dominance'. By ensuring that certain 
positions must be visible, the media.also tend to ensure that certain positions 
will remain basically invisible. For example, since the Labour Government also 
had their own plans for industrial legislation, they are unlikely to argue root 
and branch against any need for legislation whatsoever. The acceptance of
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some sort of legislation then becomes common ground between the two major 
opposing positions, in the initial signification of the topic. As the inter­
viewer's questions probe the pragmatic underpinnings of these tv/o positions, 
so they become, between them, the tv/o defined limiting positions in the 
'reasonable and realistic' case for and against the Bill. This ground now 
forms the basis for any further discussion of the topic. Positions which fall 
outside this structured controversy not only have difficulty in winning a 
hearing: they quickly appear 'unreasonable and unrealistic' when set off against 
the 'reasonable' case for-and-against the Bill. Thus, new participants to the 
debate are also constrained by the manner in which it has been signified. For 
example, if the Unions, through their accredited spokesmen, make a case against 
the Bill within the existing 'terms of reference', they can be argued with or 
opposed, but they will be understood as acting 'reasonably' within the established 
rules of controversy and opposition. But if a Union spokesman were to introduce 
a new premise - such as, for example, the view that the 'right to strike' is a 
fundamental freedom, won after prolonged struggle, and should not be lightly 
cast aside - this immediately appears as an 'extreme' view: it does not require 
another participant to signify its proposer as 'an extremist' - simply by taking 
a position which runs counter to the on-going 'terms of reference', he will 
signify his own extremism.
D. Two other kinds of groups may gain, at a later stage, a degree of 
'access' to the debate. The first consists of 'expert witnesses' who are 
professionally knowledgeable about industrial relations. Experts are, of course, 
by definition, defined as speaking to a controversial issue in neutral, impartial, 
non-partisan terms. Individual experts may have loyalties to one or other side 
in a controversy, but their right to contribute to the definition of an issue 
depends on their expressing an informed, uncommitted view. Their contribution 
may thus consist of 'filling out' and amplifying the topic in terms of 
additional information, skilled or shrewd assessments. It is only very occasionally
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than an expert can so forcefully put a point of view in an already structured 
debate in such a way as to alter, fundamentally, the basic terms of its 
s ignif icat ion.
The other 'group' is 'the general public itself'. But the 'general
public' is not ono of the active participants or principal actors in the
event: they cannot speak as institutional spokesmen or as experts: they are
not organized in ways which are visible to the medium. Their views, then,
will enter the debate in a mediated and subordinate form. What 'the general
public thinks' will be reported on by journalists or invoked by one side or 
> * * 
the other in the controversy. Or reports on the passage of the topic will avail
themselves of random items of 'vox pop' interviews - a sort of instant sampling
of men and women-in-the-street, in brief snippets, where the point of the
exercise is, precisely, that 'there are many different views', and that they
are all equally inexpert. Occasionally, some 'current affairs discussion' time
will be given over to a studio discussion including (typically) large numbers
of, say, rank-and-file trade unionists who, under the prod of a media chairman,
stimulate a 'lively exchange’ at a somewhat more grass-roots level than in
the more regular studio discussion of the issue. Here too the producer is
required to ensure a degree of 'balance1, at a lower level, between those who
are 'for' and those who are 'against' legislation. Whereas accredited witnesses
and institutional spokesmen appear, of right, in their representative person or,
and are given time to develop an argument, the participants to 'studio discussions'
always appear in large numbers, 'impersonally', have to make their points
rapidly in the cut and thrust of debate. They clearly serve the function of a
studio cross-section of the 'general public', given a brief chance to air their
views, odd and cranky or unrepresentative as they may be. This is not a position
from which a structured counter-argument or counter-definitions of the situation
can be launched.
In the passage of the structured topic through the media, the broad­
casting institutions may take further opportunities to develop and amplify the
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topic as it has been constituted. This may take the form of a ’documentary' 
background treatment of the issue, for which the media themselves take 
editorial responsibility. Here, the facts relevant to the terms of the issue 
can be resumed: the professionals can make 'pragmatic' assessments of 'how 
successful*the Government or Opposition is in furthering/checking legislation. 
They cannot, however, express a point of view editorially which favours one 
side or the other. Instead, they must also resume the arguments of the main 
protagonists, giving the initial definers a second or third opportunity to 
express a point of view.
The 'common ground* provides the basic terms in which the topic will be 
elaborated. But it also becomes, in real terms, the terrain on which bargains 
can be struck and compromises made. The media frequently play a role in, and 
have a vested interest in, this process of institutionalised bargaining. They 
share, with the political and institutional elites, the notion that 'politics 
is the art of the possible', and that, to achieve the possible, each side must 
concede something so that conflict can be resolved. Part of the 'impartial 
reporting' by media newsmen is, then, to try to predict when bargains are 
imminent, and what their terms will be, even when the accredited spokesmen den 
that negotiations are in fact in progress. Another part of their function is 
to preside over studio discussions, again between accessed spokesmen and experts, 
in which the possible terms of negotiation and compromise are hypothetically 
rehearsed, and each side to the controversy probed for its willingness to 
negotiate. The media thus develop a structured interest in the institutional 
resolution of conflict: a position which is 'neutral' so far as the two sides 
in the structured controversy is concerned, but not 'neutral' in relation to 
the political system as a whole. It makes the media the unwitting accomplices 
of conflict-resolution.
E. The structuring of the topic is unlikely to be breached, either in 
media or in political terms, from within that structure. In the case of the 
IEB, there was little or no further movement until the terms of the debate
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were rudely shattered by militant, 'unofficial' action by groups with a more 
intransigent view of the legislation than had anywhere so far achieved 
visibility in the media. Once again, the structure of definitions is broken 
by events which occur outside the media, and to which the media must respond. 
■Militant shop stewards bring sections of workers out on strike against a ruling 
of the Court: their action is made official by their Union: the Union is then 
summoned by the Court, is judged to be acting illegally (either for what it is 
doing, or for failing to recognize the Court), and sanctioned: there are 
clashes between pickets and police at the factory gates. At these levels, 
and in these events, new, potential 'definitions of the situation' come into 
play. The case against legislation which these events signify fall right 
outside the boundaries which the previous definitions have helped to erect.
What they point to is a definition of the IRB as a kind of class legislation, 
an attack on basic working class institutions. It is unlikely, however, that 
this viewpoint will now enter the signification of the issue as a legitimate 
ground for opposition. The previous, pro/con signification of the event is 
already in operation: and the new, dramatic events will tend to be 'mapped' 
into that structure. They will be debated in terms of how they breach, extend, 
modify, affect that on-going definition. Thus, strikes, militant action, clashes 
between pickets and police are signified in terms of the consequences they have - 
making the Government (whose case.we have heard) take a 'tougher line' by standing 
behind the Court: or forcing the Opposition and the Unions into a 'more 
intransigent position' (than that which they earlier expressed in reasoned 
debate). Strikers and pickets do not have the power to redefine an issue in 
the media. They can only be signified as 'justified' or 'unjustified', 'illegal' 
and. therefore 'illegitimate', 'unreasonable and irrational' - against the back­
ground of legality, legitimacy, reasonableness and rationality which already 
commands the debate. It is, indeed, their 'illegitimacy', not their 'definition 
of the situation', which commands the, news coverage. The original definers of 
the situation now have access again, to assist in the amplified definition of the
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strikes and the pickets. The latter are easily cast in the role of 'folk 
devils': they are 'extremists', a 'handful of militantsagitators': their 
leaders are 'anxious to be martyrs'. The media do, of course, give these 
militant leaders a chance to 'put their point of view' - they gain a temporary 
and limited access (though, once the strikes die down, and the immediate 
confrontation is resolved, they will pass once again into invisibility, and 
their case with them). But they do not, and are not invited to, command the 
redefinition of the situation, or to extend the terms of the controversy. They 
must .justify their actions and appearance,, apologize, as it were, for appearing 
on the stage at all as participants, and explain the illegitimacy of their 
actions. If they enter, at length, an argument of a reasoned kind, they must 
come to terms with the pro-con structure of debate already established: they 
move on defined terrain, and are trapped by its terms. If they stand outside 
the 'reasonable case', for or against, they appear to be sloganizing, and their 
very militancy signifies their extremism. It is extremely difficult for them 
to evade their own stigmatization. They achieve access, then: but only on terms 
already pre-established. What is at issue is not their view of the IBB, but 
their militancy against it, their violence, their illegality, their marginality, 
their unrepresentativeness. They, too, will be 'balanced'. Other shop floor 
workers will be found to say that their militant brothers, have 'gone too far', 
ought to have kept their opposition within the framework of the law. It is 
difficult in these structured conditions to get a hearing for the view.' that is 
it precisely the question of whether there should be a law or not, which is 
at issue. It is even more difficult for spokesmen who, having never been 
legitimated participants in the regular distribution of access, have few of 
the 'skills and competences' of reasoned debate at their command. Thus, though 
they have fractured, temporarily, the structure of definitions of the situation, 
their' intervention has simply served to shift the terms of the debate to another 
level: one where even deeper pre-suppositions are in play, and where the sacred 
nature of the social order itself can be mobilized against them. There nay be
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many who oppose an IEB: there will be fewer who will defend actions which are 
signified as 'illegal' or 'violent', since illegality threatens the 'rule of 
law* which is part of the 'common ground' on which all reasonable parties 
take their stand, and 'violence' represents a threat to social order itself.
If the Government cannot 'win' a debate about legislation, it can certainly 
command a debate which is signified as being about 'lav/ and order'. This 
displacement of the issue to a more primordial ideological level strengthens 
the existing terras of the issue. And the displacement occur at more than one 
level in the media. For the militant spokesmen have been preceded by pictures 
of pickets and police locked in struggle. And though these struggles are 
really instances of the structural conflict between Government and organized 
labour, they will have been signified in the news as belonging essentially to 
the 'law and order' category. In allowing the militants to appear and speak, 
the media, once again, demonstrate their flexibility, their balance and 
impartiality. The structure of access is temporarily broken. The underlying 
logic of the situation, however, is unbreakable.
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IV
There are more ’obstacles to communication' than are dreamt of in any 
conspiracy theory. We have not been discussing censorship - either editorial 
censorship by the media institutions, nor self-censorship by the media 
professionals, nor external censorship of the media institutions by government 
or State. All these do, also, exist: but they have not been the subject of 
our consideration. Nor have we been discussing the personal and overt biases 
of media personnel. What we have been pointing to is the manner in which the 
actions of individual men, with a plurality of viewpoints, are constrained by 
the structures in which they operate. What has commanded our attention is 
the defined way in v/hich the structures of power and the structures of broad­
casting are articulated with one another. In part, this is a matter of 
institutional connections. In part, these institutional links are framed by 
structures of understanding, by a 'reciprocity of perspectives', which is no 
less dominant in its final consequences because it is, also, complex.
Let us now try to sum the argument up in terms rather different from 
those so far employed. Since the right of universal adult suffrage was won, 
formally, every adult is a member of 'political society'. He votes at regular 
intervals for his parliamentary representative: he elects local representatives. 
In addition, he may belong to various kinds of voluntary or professional 
associations, which enable the citizen to voice an opinion or contribute some­
thing to the way the major decisions v/hich affect our lives are defined and 
taken. This formal process of democratization was not given as a right but 
won in struggle. But, having been won, it has become enshrined in lav/, 
legislation and in institutions: it has also become the corner-stone of the 
dominant democratic ideology. In fact, however, this formal democratization 
has not led to a massive increase in the degree of participation by ordinary 
citizens in the pivotal decisions. Society has grown technically and socially 
more complex. More significantly, the major social decisions remain concentrated
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within the great institutional complexes - public and private - which compose 
the modern state. These are in no 'direct' sense subject to public scrutiny 
or accountability, and they do not in fact submit themselves to the public 
very often in more than a formal way. They have, in fact, become more 
ramified in their operations and structures, and function largely as closed or 
semi-closed bureaucracies. The growth in formal democracy has not been 
accompanied by a break-up of the great power centres of society. In fact, 
quite the opposite: as political society has grown, formally, more universal, 
so business, government, administration, technology, the legal system, welfare 
etc have expanded their operations as semi-private institutions, in the manner 
of empires within the state. This is not the place to develop an account of 
the modern state. In general terms, the power of these semi-closed institutions 
is absolutely massive when set beside the power which ordinary citizens 
(including those who work for and service the great institutions, when acting 
in their capacity as ordinary citizens) can mobilize. Power, then, remains 
largely within this complex of institutions. Between them they define what 
passes for reality in the State as a whole, Those who have access to power 
are limited in number, and wield power via the institution.-; which form the 
complex of power. They are, however rich, educated, cultivated in individual 
terms, essentially powerful because they are institutional persons: they 
'personify' the system of power.
However, because these centres of power, and the powerful elites 
within them, function within a formal democracy, they must appear to operate 
in a manner which 'wins the consent' - even if that consent is passive - of 
the majority. So, in societies like ours, which remain societies of deep 
inequality, but where formal democracy prevails, the shaping and winning of 
consent, the exercise of social and cultural hegemony, is a necessary 
condition for the continuing exercise of power. The dominant classes cannot 
and do not rule by consent alone. All societies depend, ultimately, on the 
sanctions of coercion to reinforce and stabilize the giving and taking of consent.
t  *
But stable societies can, in one sense, be defined by the degree to which, in 
them, open coercion gives way to the management of.consent. Consent is the 
process by which the relatively powerless and un-organized grant to the power­
ful and organized the right, the legitimacy, to act on their behalf. In 
organized societies of our type, the management of legitimacy, the shaping of 
a favourable consensus, and the exercise of hegemony are the pivotal mechanisms, 
the 'operators', of the system.
Many institutions contribute to the development and maintenance of
hegemonic domination: but, of these, the mass media systems are probably
(along with the schools) the critical ones. Technically sophisticated systems
of communication have developed everywhere, parallel to the growth of corporate
class societies of the type I have been describing. Internally, these systems
show a tendency to function rather like the other institutions of the state.
But they also have an additional, external function, v/hich the other institutic
of the state perform only residually. They 'connect' the centres of power
with the dispersed publics: they mediate the public discourse between elites
and the governed. Thus they become, pivotally, the site and terrain on which
the making and shaping of consent is exercised, and, to some degree, contested,
(17)They are key institutions in the operation of cultural hegemony. .
The dominant systems of power are paralleled by the dominant systems 
of public communication: for the power to rule and govern is paralleled by 
the power to shape the consensus in favour of the powerful. Political and 
economic power is shadowed by what we may call the unequal distribution of 
cultural,, power. Cultural power consists, essentially, of the command over 
certain crucial processes: (a) the power to define which issues will enter 
the circuit of public communications; (b) the power to define the terms in 
which the issue will be debated; (c) the power to define who will speak to the 
issues and the terms; (d) the power to manage the debate itself in the media.
The mass media systems are, then, differentially linked to the centres 
of power and authority in our society, and to the general public. They, too,
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operate in 'formal democracies', and they are required to serve wide publics 
in widely differing ways. No such communications system cam afford to 'ignore' 
the audience, the public. But the public, while occupying the mind of the 
broadcaster continuously as the ideal-typical recipient of his message, does 
not and cannot stand in the same position, where the exercise of cultural 
power is concerned, as the elites. The media therefore reproduce the structure 
of domination/subordination which elsewhere characterizes the system as a 
whole. In addition, the communications institutions have their own complex 
articulation with power, their own 'relative autonomy1. They have a great 
deal of day-to-day autonomy over programme production. They are not, except 
residually, directly in the day-to-day command of the political and economic 
power elites# Conflicts of interest clearly can, and do, arise between them.
The less smooth is the exercise of hegemony, the less mutual will be-the 
relations between, say, the politicians and the media professionals. Even at 
the best of times, the media are required to give the government in power, 
and other institutional spokesmen the privileged right of access, because the 
media must also reflect alternative viewpoints. Although, the media have a 
right and duty to reflect the viewpoints of the dominant sectors, and are 
closely, regularly, and continuously dependent on them as sources, they also 
have some counter-vailing obligation to 'seek out* issues and 'inform the public* 
on issues which those in power would prefer to keep silent. Journalists and 
editors, who have a professional duty to be 'well-informed1, also have a 
professional reputation to defend as 'fearless', 'independent of power'. If, 
then, overall, the media serve to reproduce the hegemonic definitions, together 
with their contradictions, it is not because there is an open conspiracy or 
collusion to defraud the public, or to 'sell* the consent of the masses to' 
the- dominant .classes. Nor, however, does it mean that the media stand outside 
the complex of power and hegemony, and are neutral in relation to it. They 
are both 'relatively autonomous' institutions of the power nexus, and yet 
also 'articulated in dominance' with those institutions. It is the complex
Varticulation of structures which regulates this relation fin dominance*•
The shaping and making of consent functions, not in spite of, but via those 
structures. And, as the messages and programmes which the media systems 
produce negotiate and pass through those structured, so, inevitably, they cease 
to be random messages about the social world, given and taken in some *free 
market of the word*, and become instead elements in a structured communication 
process.
An institution like the BBC is famous for its ’relative independence 
of power*, its balance and impartiality. The alternative commercial television 
channel, though privately owned, is hedged about with conditions which impose 
many of the same requirements on it. One of the moments at which that 
* independence * was most severely tested was in the General Strike of 1926.
There was a strong section of the Cabinet which wanted to commandeer the BBC 
for the Government, once the strike had begun. Lord Reith, the Director- 
General, argued powerfully and persuasively that it should and must remain 
independent. His reasoning is worth recapitulating. Once the strike had 
been declared illegal in the Courts (a 'reading of the situation since 
contested*), Reith argued that "there could be no question about our /the BBC,
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supporting the Government in general". Anything "contrary to the spirit of
the judgement," and which night prolong the strike, was unacceptable. Official
communiques "would have been expected and demanded irrespective of its political.
complexion". On the other hand, Reith's view was that, once the Government
directly commandeered the BBC, the BBC would lose its reputation for impartiality
its credibility, its "considerable measure of independence", and thus its
position as "a national institution and a national asset". It is important
to remember that this "battle for the independence of the BBC was something
more than, a battle for the neutrality of the medium". As Professor Asa 
(l9)Briggs has remarked, Reith "had a standpoint of his own":
"He had no sympathy with the coal owners, but he had little 
sympathy with organized labour either and disliked the 
very idea of a general strike. He preferred mediation to 
showdown".
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Reith, then, laid a double injunction on the BBC in its moment of crisis.
To be "for the Government in the crisis", and to "be allowed to define its 
position in the country". It is summed up in one of the most delicate of 
formulations ever put on paper by a broadcaster:
"But, on the other hand, since the BBC was a national 
institution, and since the Government in this crisis 
were acting for the people, the BBC was for the Govern­
ment in the crisis too.”
When the relationship of communications to power is framed by so subtle 
and complex a negotiation, it seems crude and vulgar to speak of 'obstacles'.
Stuart Hall
Centre for Cultural Studies 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston
Birmingham B15 2TT.
October 1973
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